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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Scott Molen appeals from the judgment of conviction and
sentence entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of lewd conduct with a
minor under the age of sixteen
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinqs
Molen molested his eight-year-old step-granddaughter, S.Z., while she
was staying with Molen and Molen's wife, S.Z.'s grandmother, in Garden Valley,
Idaho. (Tr., p.275, L . l - p.296, L.1.)

While S.Z. and Molen were alone in

Molen's house, Molen pushed S.Z. onto his bed, removed her clothes, and
penetrated her vagina with his penis. (R., p.281, L.5 - p.286, L.24.) Molen
stopped when S.Z.'s grandmother came home and S.Z. was able to get Molen
off her. (Tr., p.284, L.20 - p.285, L.2.) In addition to having genital-to-genital
contact with S.Z., Molen also fondled S.Z. (Tr., p.285, L.13

-

p.284, L.4) and

masturbated in front of her (Tr., p.288, Ls.19-22). Molen also made repeated
sexual advances toward her. (Tr., p.286, Ls.2-11; p.287, Ls.4-14.) Molen was
charged by information with one count of lewd conduct with a minor child under
the age of sixteen. (R., Vol. !I, pp.283-84.) Following a trial, a jury found Molen
guilty as charged. (R., Voi. 11, pp.396, R., Vol. 111, 605-08.) The district court
entered judgment upon the jury's verdict and imposed a unified sentence of
twenty years, with eight years fixed. (R., Vol. Ill, p.606.) Molen timely appeals.

(R., Vol. II, pp.92-94.)

ISSUES ON APPEAL
Molen states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court deny Mr. Molen's statutory and
constitutional rights to a unanimous jury by failing to give a
unanimity instruction?

2.

Did the district court err by excluding evidence of S.Z.'s
sexual knowledge?

3.

Was Mr. Molen's right to due process violated when the
State used his silence to infer guilt?

4.

Did the district court err by failing to strike an allegation from
the Presentence Investigation Report?

5.

Does the doctrine of cumulative error require reversal?

(Appellant's Brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues an appeal as:
1.

Has Molen failed to show the district court committed error by not giving a
special unanimity instruction where the record shows evidence of only one
distinct incident that involved genital-to-genital contact?

2.

Did the district court properly exercise its discretion and act within
constitutional limitations by excluding evidence of S.Z.'s sexual
knowledge?

3.

Was it permissible for the prosecutor to reference Molen's pre-Miranda
silence for the purpose of rebutting Molen's assertion that he wanted to
talk to law enforcement when the abuse came to light?

4.

Has Molen failed to show any error, let alone an accumulation of errors,
that deprived Molen of a fair trial?

5.

Has Molen failed to show he was entitled to strike information from the
PSI where that information was not speculative or untrue?

ARGUMENT

1.
Molen Has Failed To Show The District Court Committed Error Bv Not Giving A
Unanimity Instruction
A.

Introduction
Molen argues the district court's failure to give a special unanimity

instruction constitutes reversible error. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-15.)

Molen's

claim is without merit. Molen failed to request a unanimity instruction at trial and,
therefore, failed to preserve his claim of error absent a showing of fundamental
error. Here. Molen cannot establish error. He cannot show from the record that
the state presented evidence of multiple separate and distinct acts, that could
have, by themselves, been the basis of the criminal count charged by the state.
Furthermore, because Molen took the stand and denied any sexual interaction
with S.Z., any failure to provide a special unanimity instruction was harmless.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the

appellate court exercises free review. Miller v. State, 135 ldaho 261, 265, 16
P.3d 937, 941 (Ct. App. 2000). To be reversible error, any error in the jury
instructions must have misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining party.
v. Row, 131 ldaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082,1089 (1998).

State

C.

Molen Did Not Preserve The Issue Of Instructional Error Because He Did
Not Request A Special Unanimity Instruction And Because He Cannot
Show Fundamental Error
Absent a showing of fundamental error, Molen's instructional claims are

not reviewable.
(2008).

See State v. Johnson, 145 ldaho 970, 977, 188 P.3d 912, 919

"No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an

instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its
verdict ...."

I.C.R. 30(b).

Molen did not request a unanimity instruction.

Consequently, he claims fundamental error. (Appellant's Brief, p.1 I.) Appellate
court's may "review[] fundamental errors in jury instructions even in the absence
of an objection below. Johnson, 145 ldaho at 977, 188 P.3d at 919 (citing
v. Anderson, 144 ldaho 743, 749, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007)).

"To determine

whether there [is] fundamental error, [a court] must first determine whether there
was any error."

For the reasons set forth below, Moten has failed to establish

error.
D.

Molen Was Not Entitled To A Special Unanimity lnstruction Because He
Has Not Shown From The Record That The State Presented Evidence Of
Multiple Separate And Distinct Acts That Could Have, Bv Themselves,
Been The Basis Of The Count Charaed
In Idaho, a criminal defendant may be convicted only when a unanimous

jury concludes that the criminal act charged has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. ldaho Const., art. I, § 7. Ordinarily, an instruction informing
the jury that its "verdict must be unanimous" will suffice to protect the defendant's
right to jury unanimity. State v. Nunez, 133 ldaho 13, 19, 981 P.2d 738, 744
(1999). It is only when the state presents evidence of multiple separate and

distinct acts, any of which could by themselves form the basis of the count
charged, that 'Tury unanimity must be protected by prosecutorial election of a
single act upon which it will rely for conviction or by a clarifying instruction
requiring the jurors to agree that the same underlying criminal act has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Miller v. State, 135 ldaho 261, 268, 16
P.3d 937, 944 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v. Petrich, 683 P.2d 173, 178 (Wash.
1984) (emphasis in original)); see also State v. Montova, 140 ldaho 160, 167-68,
90 P.3d 910, 917-18 (Ct. App. 2004).
The state charged Molen with one count of lewd conduct. The amended
day of June, 2004, though the
information alleged that Molen "on or about the lS'
3oth day of July, 2004, andlor the 1%'Day of June, 2005, though the 2oth day of
June, 2005," committed lewd conduct by having "genital-to-genital contact" with
S.Z. (R., Vol. 11, p.283.) S.Z. testified that while she was staying at the house
and was alone with Molen in his bedroom that he pushed her on the bed,
removed her clothes, and penetrated her vagina with his penis. (Tr., p.281, L.l

-

p.283, L.24.) This was the only sexual encounter described by S.Z. that involved
genital-to-genital contact. Although S.Z. described other sexual encounters at
trial, such as Molen fondling her when they were watching a movie (Tr., p.285,
Ls.13-24), and masturbating in front of her (Tr., p.288, Ls.12-22), these
encounters did not involve genital-to-genital contact and, therefore, did not have
an evidentiary basis for meeting the elements of the crime with which Molen was
charged.

Indeed, S.Z. made clear on cross-examination that although there

were multiple sexual encounters and advances, only once was there genital-togenital contact:

Q.

Okay. And when you say "did it," what do you mean?

A.

Did sex stuff?

Q.

Okay. How many times in total did Scott [Molen] ever
try to put his penis in your vagina?

A.

All I remember is just once.

Q.

Okay. That was the time where?

A.

In his bedroom.

(Tr., p.318, L.25 p.319, L.7.)
Moreover, a review of the record shows that no other encounter between
S.Z. and Molen included genital-to-genital contact. The state's claim of genitalto-genital contact was based on the sole incident where Molen pushed S.Z. onto
the bed and removed her clothes. In closing, the prosecutor stated that the
genital-to-genital contact that formed the basis for the charge was Molen
penetrating S.Z. with his penis: "She also testified that the touching was what
we're worried about here, the genital-to-genital contact, that the defendant took
off his clothes, that he got on top of her, that it hurt, and he put his penis into her
vagina." (Tr., p.906, Ls.18-23.) The prosecutor closed his argument stating:
[S.Z.] and the defendant have a special relationship, a relationship
that no child should have with an adult, a relationship where they
were alone in the house, the defendant had his clothes off. He
took [S.Z.]'s clothes off. He pushed her down on the bed. He got
on top of her. He put his penis into her vagina. It hurt. She told
him to stop.
(Tr., p.925, Ls.1-8.) The prosecutor further argued during rebuttal:

You know what he's charged with, genital-to-genital contact. Has
she ever said that he did not do that? Has she ever said that he
did not strip her clothes off and push her down on the bed and put
his naked body on top of her and start moving up and down and
having genital-to-genital contact?
(Tr., p.976, Ls.9-15.)
Because there is no doubt the conduct forming the basis of the charge, as
presented by the prosecution, was the one instance of Molen touching S.Z.'s
vagina with his penis in his bedroom while the two of them were naked, Molen
has failed to establish error based on the lack of a unanimity instruction.
Although Molen acknowledges "the State focused on one act in
particular," he nevertheless complains, "the jury heard evidence from SZ that she
had originally alleged that sex occurred approximately twelve times, and she
reduced that number to 'four or five' at the trial," and S.Z. "testified that there
were times that 'privates touched' when their clothes were on . . . " (Appellant's
Brief, p.9.) The state is unclear of the exact testimony to which Molen refers
because he failed to include any citation to the record in support of his argument
(*

id.) To the extent he is referring to S.Z.'s grand jury testimony or the

statements she made during the CARES interview, neither establishes the need
for a unanimity instruction.
In addition to S.Z.'s testimony at trial, the state submitted a tape and
transcript of the CARES interview. In that interview, S.Z. described Molen in his
bedroom naked, pushing her on the bed, removing her clothes and underwear,
and "putting his thing into me." (CARES Tr., p.21, L.9 - p.23, L.4.) S.Z. also

stated, consistent with her testimony at trial, that this was the only time Molen
penetrated her with his penis:
Q.

"Okay. So there was just one time that his front private went
in your vagina?"

A.

Uh-huh.

(CARES Tr., p.73, Ls.1-3.)

The state recognizes there were other sexual

advances described in the CARES interview that could have involved genital-togenital contact. However, the description of those advances did not specify
where on the girl's body the touching occurred:
Q.

Humping. Oh, you haven't told me about that.
What's humping? Can you show me humping?

A.

It's, um, kind of like dogs.
(indicating).

Q.

Okay. So he was doing that upstairs?

A.

(No audible response.)

Q.

In which room?

Okay.

Urn, he was going like this

In my room.
Upstairs in your room he was doing humping. And he didn't
have any clothes on; did I get that right?
Uh-huh.
And what about you?
I had my clothes on.

Okay. So you were showing me that his body was moving?
(No audible response.)
How was it moving?

A.

Um, forward and back.

(CARES Tr., p.37, L.25 - p.38, L.20.) While this passage clearly describes a
sexual advance, nowhere does S.Z. describe genital-to-genital contact with
Molen. Consequently, because there is no evidence of genital-to-genital contact
in this passage there is no separate, distinct, and independent instance of lewd
and lascivious conduct other than when Molen was naked, pushed S.Z. onto his
bed and put his penis in her vagina.
Even if S.Z.'s CARES testimony could be construed as referencing
additional genital-to-genital contact, this testimony, alone, did not entitle Molen to
a unanimity instruction. S.Z.'s statements at the CARES interview were not
made under oath and, therefore, were not admitted for their substance. The jury
was specifically instructed: "Evidence that on some former occasion a witness
made a statement while he or she was not under oath that may have been
consistent -- inconsistent with his or her testimony at trial may be considered by
you only for the purpose of testing the believability of the testimony that the
witness gave during trial and for the purpose of considering whether any
suggestion was made directly or indirectly concerning what the witness should or
should not say while testifying at trial." (Tr., p.891, Ls.5-15 (emphasis added).)
Consequently, here, where the CARES interview was not admitted for a
substantive reason, but for credibility, the statements cannot be an independent
basis for finding Molen guilty of lewd conduct. Accordingly, Molen was not
entitled to a special unanimity instruction based on statements S.Z. made during
her CARES interview.

To the extent Molen relies on S.Z.'s preliminary hearing testimony as
evidence of other acts entitling him to a unanimity instruction, this argument also
fails. The state recognizes that at the preliminary hearing S.Z. stated Molen
penetrated her and had sex with her with on multiple occasions. However, the
preliminary hearing transcript was never admitted into evidence.

Rather,

portions of the transcript were read to the jury during closing argument by
defense counsel as argument and not evidence. (Tr., p.870, Ls.13-19.) Defense
counsel specifically referenced the fact that S.Z. stated at the preliminary hearing
that Molen had sex with her on multiple occasions. Although this testimony was
referenced, it is not evidence.

I.C.J.I. 204 (provided to the jury here as Jury

lnstruction No.16). Because it is not evidence, but argument, it cannot be the
basis for finding a distinct and separate incident of genital-to-genital contact that
would entitle Molen to a unanimity instruction. Moreover, any error that may
have occurred in relation to the presentation of this information to the jury was
invited and cannot serve as a basis for relief.

Cf. State v.

Carlson, 134 ldaho

389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Blake, 133 ldaho 237, 240, 985

E.

Even Assumina The District Court's Failure To Sua Sponte Give A
Unanimitv lnstruction Constituted Fundamental Error, The Error Was
Harmless Under The Facts And Circumstances Of This Case
In Miller, the ldaho Court of Appeals recognized that even if a district court

errs by not sua sponte giving a special unanimity instruction, such error will be
deemed harmless so long as the reviewing court is able to declare, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same result even if the

instruction had been given. State v. Miller, 135 ldaho 261, 268-69, 16 P.3d 937,
944-45 (Ct. App. 2000). Miller was charged with two counts of lewd conduct with
a minor under sixteen. At trial, the victim testified as to six separate instances of
sexual misconduct, any of which could have formed the basis for conviction
under the charged counts.

Although the court of appeals agreed with Miller

that under such circumstances, the district court was required to have given a
unanimity instruction, it ultimately found the trial error to be harmless.

at 268,

16 P.3d at 944
In reaching its determination, the court noted that the case turned upon
the victim's testimony, which, the court noted, the 'Tury obviously found . . .
credible, as Miller was found guilty on both counts of the indictment." .
&
j at 268,
16 P.3d at 944; see also Montova, 140 ldaho at 166, 90 P.3d at 916 ("By finding
Montoya guilty, the jury obviously found C.H.'s testimony more credible than
Montoya's testimony. There is no reason for this Court to conclude that the jury
would have believed some of the incidents alleged by C. H., but not the others.")
Applying the reasoning of W

r and Montova to the facts of this case, it is

clear that any error in lack of a special unanimity instruction was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. As in &r,

the only issue the jury had to decide in

order to convict Molen was whether it believed S.Z.'s testimony regarding the
alleged incidents of sexual contact. The jury obviously found S.Z.'s testimony to
be credible, as it convicted Molen. Thus, as in

m,the lack of a unanimity

instruction should be deemed harmless because it is clear, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that the jury would have convicted Molen even had such an instruction
been given.
Furthermore, here, like in Montova, the defendant took the stand and
asserted a general denial of all the sexual acts alleged. (Tr., p.635, L.24 - p.636,
L.18.) As recently explained in State v. Banks, 46 P.3d 546 (Kan. 2002), a case
cited by this Court in Montova,l40 Idaho at 166, 90 P.3d at 916, a general denial
supports a finding that the lack of a unanimity instruction was inconsequential:
In those cases in which the defense to charges based on multiple
acts is a general denial, differentiation among a number of events
is not required of the jury and therefore is not an issue in
controversy. The jury either accepts the victim's testimony as to all
and convicts, or it accepts the defendant's denial and acquits on all
charges. The failure to give a unanimity instruction in those
instances is harmless error; it does not relate to an issue in
controversy.
Id. at
-

551 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Accord State v. Hill, 11

P.3d 506, 512 (Kan. App. 2000) ("By the jury's rejection of the appellant's
general denial, the court could unequivocally say that there was no rational basis
by which the jury could have found that the defendant committed one of the
incidents but did not commit the other. . . ."); R.L.G.. Jr. v. State, 712 So.2d 348,
368 (Ala. Cr. App. 1997) (same); People v. Brown, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407 (Cal.
App. 1996) (same).
Under the circumstances of this case, there was no rational basis by
which the jury could have found that Molen committed some of the acts alleged
by S.Z. but did not commit the others. Having rejected Molen's general denial, it
is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same

resutt even had a unanimity instruction been given. Thus, even if the court erred,
Molen has failed to show error requiring reversal.
11.
Molen Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Excludincl Evidence Of
S.Z.'s Sexual Knowiedqe
A.

Introduction
Molen complains the district court violated his constitutional rights and

committed reversible error when it excluded proffered evidence as irrelevant and
denied him an opportunity to call witnesses to explain S.Z.'s sexual knowledge
based on her mother's sexual behavior. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-23.) Molen's
argument fails because 1) he failed to raise any constitutional claim below and,
therefore, cannot raise those claims for the first time on appeal; 2) he cannot
show S.Z.'s sexual knowledge was relevant to whether Molen penetrated S.Z.
with his penis; and 3) he cannot show that the trial court's determination that
"whatever probative value [the evidence] may have [was] substantially
outweighed by the danger of confusion of issues, misleading the jury, and unfair
prejudice" was an abuse of discretion. (Tr., p.411, Ls.16-20.)
B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court freely reviews questions of relevancy under IRE 401

and 402. State v. Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 69-70, 44 P.3d 1122, 1124-25 (2002).
However, whether the probative value of evidence is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice under I.R.E. 403 is a discretionary matter that will
be disturbed only if the appellant demonstrates that the district court abused its

discretion. State v. Enno, 119 ldaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624 (1991);

State

v. Birkla, 126 ldaho 498, 500, 887 P.2d 43,45 (Ct. App. 1994).
C.

The District Court Properlv Limited Molen's Abilitv To Call Witnesses
Describing S.Z.'s Mother's Sexual Behavior To Explain S.Z.'s Sexual
Knowledge
Prior to trial, Molen filed a motion in limine seeking to admit evidence of

S.Z.'s "past exposure to adult sexual matters through the sexually explicit
lifestyle, conduct, materials and words of her mother and her mother's friends . .

. ." (R., Vol. 11, p.285.)

Molen generally asserted S.Z. "exhibited hyper

sexualized behavior," had observed her mother having sex with multiple partners
and discussed sex with her.

(R., Vol. 11, p.293.)

Molen argued that this

explained S.Z.'s knowledge and use of sexual language.

Despite these

generalized assertions of a hyper sexualized environment, Molen's offer of proof
was limited. Molen only identified S.Z.'s knowledge as it pertained to "knowing
about oral sex," sex like "doggies do it," and wanting a "tattoo on her pooty." (R.,
Vol. 11, p.293.)

Molen also sought to introduce evidence that S.Z. allegedly

attempted to (1) "French kiss" Molen and her grandmother, (2) watched her
grandparents having sex, and (3) pulled her grandparents' pants down. (R., Vol.
11, p.293.)

The district court correctly denied Molen's motion because this

evidence was not relevant to any fact of consequence in this case. This pre-trial
ruling was revisited during trial where the ruling was affirmed on the basis of
relevancy and that the potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any
possible probative value. Molen has failed to establish the district court erred.

1.

Molen Did Not Obiect To The Exclusion Of Evidence On
Constitutional Grounds, And, Therefore. Did Not Preserve His
Constitutional Claim For Appellate Review

Molen first claims the district court's evidentiary ruling "denied his right to
cross-examination protected by the Sixth Amendment and his right to due
process protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution by denying him the right to present evidence. . . ." (Appellant's Brief,
p.15.) Molen did not raise these claims below and, therefore, has not preserved
his constitutional claims on appeal.

Matters not raised to the trial court are

generally not preserved for appeal. State v. Rozaiewski, 130 ldaho 644, 645,
945 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Ct. App. 1997). To preserve an issue, a proper and timely
objection must be made in the trial court. State v. Carlson, 134 ldaho 389, 398,
3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). That objection must further state the specific
grounds on which it is based.

Id.

his constitutional claims below.

It is incontrovertible that Molen did not assert
Therefore, on appeal, he can only claim

evidentiary error based on the ldaho Rules of Evidence,
2.

The Evidence Shown Bv Molen's Offer Of Proof Was Not Relevant
To A Fact Of Consequence In This Case

To be admissible, evidence must first be relevant. I.R.E. 402. Evidence
that tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the case, and has
any tendency to make the existence of that fact more probable than it would be
without the evidence, is relevant. I.R.E. 401; State v. Hocker, 115 ldaho 544,
768 P.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1989). Contrary to Molen's assertion, the evidence he
proffered in his offer of proof, other than the instances of "French kissing," was
not relevant to any fact of consequence.

The district court concluded, based on what was stated in the offer of
proof, that S.Z.'s sexual knowledge and use of certain sexual terms was
irrelevant to whether Molen had genital-to-genital contact with her.

After

receiving the offer of proof, the district court reasoned: "based on what I know
about this case, the fact that this child saw her mother having intercourse in
more than one fashion or whatever is not relevant to the facts of this case."
(06108107 Tr., p.24, Ls.15-19.) Accordingly, the district court denied Molen's
request to put on witnesses describing S.Z.'s mother's sexual behavior and
S.Z.'s observance of that behavior.
With respect to S.Z.'s knowledge of certain sexual terminology, whether
S.Z. knew "about 'oral sex,"' sex "like doggies do it," and wanted a tattoo "on
[her] pooty" makes it neither more likely, nor less likely, that Molen put his penis
in S.Z.'s vagina. Molen, however, claims the evidence is relevant because, he
asserts: "[ilf jurors are not able to see possible alternative explanations for a
child's sexual knowledge, apart from the alleged incident, they will undoubtedly
assume that his or her knowledge did in fact come from the alleged incident."
(Appellant's Brief, p.20.) Even assuming this is true, Molen's offer of proof was
not sufficient because it was limited to general knowledge of one form of sex,
"oral sex," the sexual practice of animals, sex "like doggies do it," and the term
"pooty ."
This proffered evidence had nothing to do with the allegation of abuse -sexual intercourse with Molen on top of S.Z. penetrating her with his penis.
Indeed, in her testimony at trial S.Z. did not mention oral sex, doggie sex, or use

the term "pooty." The only statements made by S.Z. relating to these terms
comes from the CARES interview. In that interview, S.Z. states that Molen licked
her genital area with his tongue. She never uses the term "oral sex" but rather
states that he licked her the way dogs lick each other:
Q.

What kind of licking was he doing right here
(indicating)?

A.

Kind of like how dogs lick. But he didn't have that big
of a tongue.

(CARES Tr., p.51, Ls.23 -25.)
S.Z.'s testimony about being "licked" like doggies lick themselves does not
demonstrate knowledge of "oral sex" but is entirely consistent with how an eightyear-old would describe that occurrence. Consequently, Molen's offer of proof
failed to establish the majority of sexual knowledge he wanted to present was
relevant.
With respect to S.Z.'s actions Molen sought to introduce, the court
tentatively ruled Molen could introduce evidence regarding S.Z.'s alleged
attempts to French kiss her grandparents stating:
I will allow, however, depending on what comes in with the CARES
interview and that sort of thing, evidence about her knowledge of
the question of French kissing. Because that seems to me to be
clearly relevant, and I'm not sure that that would be precluded by
the rule on the victim's prior sexual history. And that would include
evidence of the child having engaged in that sort of thing in the
past.

(Tr., p.52, Ls.6-14.) The district court, however, concluded S.Z.'s other alleged
actions -- watching her grandparents having sex and trying to pull their pants
down -- was not relevant. The district court properly exercised its discretion by

excluding irrelevant evidence and permitting other evidence depending on what
evidence was presented at trial.
Molen cites a number of cases where alternative knowledge of sexual
acts was found to be relevant. In addition to being twenty years old and not
taking into account the advanced sexual exposure and knowledge of children
today, in each of these cases the alternative sexual knowledge was directly
related to the victim's abuse.

See State v.

Oliver, 760 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Ariz.

1988); Summit v. State, 697 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Nev. 1985); State v. Jacque, 558
A.2d 706, 708 (Me. 1989); State v. Howard, 426 A.2d 457, 462 (N.H. 1981).
Here, this simply is not the case
As articulated in m r , a defendant still must show that "the prior sexual
act was sufficiently similar to the present sexual act to give the victim the
experience and ability to contrive or imagine the molestation charge." 760 P.2d
at 1077. Molen has failed to show any connection between the language in his
offer of proof and the genital-to-genital contact he had with S.Z. Nowhere in
S.Z.'s account of Molen pushing her down and penetrating her with his penis
does she mention "oral sex," sex like "doggies do it," or the term "pooty." As a
result, S.Z.'s knowledge of these terms, regardless of where it came from, is
irrelevant to the issue of consequence. Thus, Molen has failed to show error.'

1

Molen also argues that despite the trial court's pretrial ruling, the state opened
the door by asking S.Z.'s mother, Tiffany, "did you ever talk to [S.Z.] in detail
about sex and how she might talk about that if she were to talk to the authorities
in this case?" (Tr., p.393, Ls.6-8 (emphasis added).) The trial court correctly
exercised its discretion and ruled the state did not open the door by asking this
question. (Tr., p.410, L.22 - p.412, L.5.) The question, read in context, shows

3.

Even If S.Z.'s Sexual Knowledge is Somehow Relevant, The
District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion In Concludinq That
Anv Probative Value Was Outweiahed By Unfair Preiudice

The trial court ruled that even if the evidence outlined in Molen's offer of
proof was relevant that, here, "the danger of confusion of issues, misleading the
jury, and unfair prejudice" outweighed any probative value. (Tr., p.411, Ls.1620.) Molen has not shown how this ruling was an abuse of discretion. Pursuant
to I.R.E. 403, even relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the district court's
discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice

-- which is the tendency to suggest a

decision on an improper basis -- substantially outweighs the probative value of
the evidence. State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 907 (Ct. App.
1994).

In this case the court clearly understood the standard and its

responsibilities. (Tr., p.410, L.22 - p.411, L.21.) The court reasoned that, under

that the state was asking whether or not S.Z.'s mother talked about sex and what
happened to S.Z. in preparation for her CARES interview:

Q.

Let me ask you this, Tiffany: Prior to the CARES interview,
did you ever tell [S.Z.] to make up these allegations?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever tell her what to say?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever talk to her in detail about sex and how she
might talk about that if she were to talk to the authorities in
this case.

A.

No.

(Tr., p.392, L.25 - p.393, L.9.) Accordingly, this question was limited and did not
justify a modification of the pretrial order.

the facts of this case, the probative value of the evidence proffered was
outweighed by unfair prejudice:
THE COURT: Okay. The first issue is: Is it relevant? And your
argument is that its somehow relevant because she's heard the
words before and she knew what they were, and she didn't know
what -- it wasn't because of what may or may not have happened
with the defendant but because of her prior life experiences?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Judge
THE COURT: First of all, I didn't hear anything of the -- well, I'll
take that back. Okay. I can see the possibility that somehow this
is tangentially relevant to a fact in issue. Rule 403 provides that
although relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
As I say, maybe it's tangentially relevant. But I think it is -whatever probative value it may have is substantially outweighed
by the danger of confusion of issues, misleading the jury, and
unfair prejudice.
So the motion in limine stands
(Tr., p.410, L.22 - p.411, L.21.) The trial court's balancing is supported by the
record. As set forth above, the offer of proof was limited and not related to any
direct testimony.

There was no connection between the claimed sexual

knowledge and the act charged. Any relevancy was slight and, using the court's
word, "tangential."

(T. p.41 L.6)

Additionally, the potential for unfair

prejudice was great. Molen apparently sought to introduce testimony regarding
the mother's alleged sexual promiscuity. Such information has the potential to
inflame the jury. There was, therefore, the possibility of the jury focusing on the
mother's sexual delinquencies and her role as a mother instead of whether S.Z.

was molested by Molen. Accordingly, the district court had a basis for finding a
danger of confusion of issues and the potential for such information misleading
the jury. Accordingly, the trial court, properly exercised its discretion and upheld
the pre-trial ruling excluding the evidence on the basis of I.R.E. 403.
In sum, Molen's argument fails. He cannot show S.Z.'s mother's sexual
experience or S.Z. knowledge of certain sexual terms was relevant to whether
Molen penetrated S.Z. with his penis. And, even if he could, he cannot show the
trial court's balancing of this probative value against the prejudicial nature was
an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, Molen has failed to show error,

Ill.
Molen Cannot Show The Use Of His Pre-Miranda Silence For Impeachment On
Cross-Examination Constituted Error, Much Less Fundamental Error That May
Be Reviewed For The First Time On Appeal
A.

Introduction
Molen claims his constitutional rights were violated "when the prosecutor

questioned why Mr. Molen had failed speak [sic] to the authorities and had
waited until trial to tell his version of events." (Appellant's Brief, p.23.) Molen
cannot establish that his due process rights were violated because the state is
permitted use pre-~iranda2silence on cross-examination for purposes of
impeachment. Even if the prosecutor's comments could be construed as a
comment on post-Miranda silence, those comments were permissible to rebut
Molen's claim that he waited two and a half weeks at home for the police to
make an appointment with him because he "wanted to give them [law

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21

enforcement] every opportunity to see that [he is] innocent." (Tr., p.615, L.12 p.617, L.1.)
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether the admission of evidence violates a defendant's right to remain

silent is a constitutional question reviewed de novo. State v. Moore, 131 ldaho
814, 820, 965 P.2d 174, 180 (1998).

C.

The Record Shows The Prosecutor's Questioning Refers To Molen's PreMiranda Silence And Was Made To Rebut Molen's Assertion That He
Wanted To Tell His Side Of The Story But Never Had That Opportunity
Prior To His Arrest
Under Doyle v. Ohio, 462 U.S. 610 (1976), and Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S.

603 (1982),~it is a due process violation to inquire into a defendant's postMiranda silence. Inquiry into a defendant's pre-Miranda silence, for purposes of
impeachment does not, however, violate due process regardless of whether that
silence is pre- or post-arrest.

m,455 U.S. 603; Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S.

231 (1980); State v. Lopez, 141 ldaho 575, 577, 114 P.3d 133, 135 (Ct. App.
2005) Thus, in deciding whether a Doyle violation has occurred, a court must
first determine whether the inquiry at issue refers to a defendant's pre- or postMiranda silence. Here, the inquiry was incontrovertibly pre-Miranda and, as set

m,

In
the Supreme Court held that cross-examination of a defendant with
respect to post-arrest silence is a due process violation. 426 U.S. 610. In
the Court limited the holding in Doyle to silence occurring post-Miranda. 455
U.S. 603.

w,

forth below, was made in order to rebut Molen's claim that he wanted to tell his
side of the story when the allegations first came to light.
The issue arose when, on direct examination, Molen testified:

Q.

When these charges came to light, were you approached by
anyone from law enforcement?

A.

I still, to this day, have not been approached by anyone from
law enforcement.

Q.

No one ever asked you what happened?

A.

Nobody has asked me one thing about what has happened.

Q.

Was there an appointment made, to the best of your
knowledge?

A.

Yes

Q.

Did you try to make that appointment?

A.

I was at my home for two and a half weeks waiting for them
to come and beat me up, whatever they do, arrest me,
whatever they do or at least come and do something about
this.

...
Q.

Did you want them to search your house?

A.

I wanted them to come and see how I lived. I wanted them
to come and see how my house is. I wanted -- if -- I wanted
to give them every opportunity to -- see that I'm innocent.

(Tr., p.614, L.13

-

p.617, L.1.) In response, the state cross-examined Molen

without objection as follows:
Q.

Mr. Molen, you testified that you wanted to talk to the police,
but nobody called you; is that correct? Yes or no?

A.

Yes

Q.

And you listened to the testimony of [Officer] Tammy
Kennedy on Tuesday, didn't you?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

You heard her say that she called you, and you're saying
that didn't happen?

A.

I was at my home for two weeks waiting for that call.

Q.

Okay. So you sat at home for two weeks waiting for Tammy
Kennedy to call you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

If you wanted to talk to the police so bad, why didn't you call
them?

A.

I was scared.

Q.

You were scared? Okay. But you know how to call the
police, right?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You could have easily called up Tammy Kennedy or any
other officer asking to tell your side of the story, couldn't
you?

A.

It was not my job.

Q.

Yes-or-no answer, Mr. Molen.

A.

You bet I could have called them. Sure.

Q.

But you didn't. You waited until you got your chance here to
listen to all the witnesses and then tell your story, correct?
Yes-or-no answer, Mr. Molen.

A.

Yes.

(Tr., p.672, L.7 - p.673, L.14.)
A review of these two exchanges shows that the "silence" referred to is

pre-Miranda silence. Specifically, Moien's silence when the abuse first "came to

light." (Tr., p.614, Ls.13-14.) Molen asserts that during this time he "wanted" to
talk to the police so he could tell them he was innocent

--

but was never

approached by law enforcement. It necessarily follows that if Molen's silence
predates him talking with law enforcement, it also predates any Miranda
warnings.

Molen has identified nothing in the record that would suggest

otherwise. Consequently, Molen's "silence" was pre-Miranda, and the use of this
silence by the state was not a violation of Molen's constitutional rights.
Even if Molen's silence could somehow be construed as post-Miranda, the
use of that silence to rebut Molen's claim was constitutionally permissible. PostMiranda silence can be used to (1) rebut a defendant's claim of cooperation,

Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619 n.11; (2) correct a false impression created by the
defendant's testimony, State v. Strouse, 133 ldaho 709, 992 P.2d 158 (1999); or
(3) inquire into inconsistencies between a defendant's trial testimony and his pretrial statements, Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980); see also State v.
Wolverton, 120 ldaho 559, 817 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a
prosecutor may inquire about inconsistencies between voluntary statements
made during the investigatory stage and trial testimony).
Here, the question: "You could have easily called up Tammy Kennedy or
any other officer asking to tell your side of the story, couldn't you?", falls within
the exception recognized in Strouse, 133 ldaho at 714, 992 P.2d at 163 -- using
post-Miranda silence to correct a false impression created by the defendant.
The false impression was that Molen wanted to tell his side of the story when the
allegations first came to light. The state's response -- "you could have easily

called [law enforcement] . . . . asking to tell your side of the story" simply rebutted
that impression. As a result, even if Molen's silence could be classified as postMiranda, it was not a constitutional violation.
Because Molen has failed to establish any constitutional violation in
relation to the prosecutor's cross-examination of Molen regarding his unfulfilled
desire to talk to law enforcement about S.Z.'s allegations, he has failed to show
error, much less fundamental error.
IV.
There Is No Error To Accumulate
Molen claims there was an accumulation of errors that deprived him of a
fair trial. Specifically, Molen asserts the previously discussed claims created a
cumulative prejudicial effect that requires reversal of his conviction. (Appellant's
Brief, p.31.) Because Molen has failed to establish the existence of more than
one error, he cannot establish cumulative error.
The cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities,
each of which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, show the
absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant's right to due process.
State v. Moore, 131 ldaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998). A necessary
predicate to application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error.

State

v. Hawkins, 131 ldaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998).
Molen has failed to establish the existence of any error arising out of the
jury instructions, the submission of evidence, or the prosecutor's statements
referencing Molen's pre-Miranda silence. Because Molen has failed to show that
any errors occurred in his trial, the cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable to this

case. See, e.q.,

LaBelle v. State, 130 ldaho 115, 121, 937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct.

App. 1997).

v.
The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion In Declinina To Strike
Information From The PSI
A.

Introduction
Molen contends this case must be remanded to the district court for

correction of the PSI. (Appellant's Brief, p.29.) Molen has failed to establish any
basis for doing so.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether the district court erred when it denied a motion to strike or delete

portions of the presentence investigation report is reviewed on appeal under an
abuse of discretion standard. State v. Campbell, 123 ldaho 922, 925, 854 P.2d
265,268 (Ct. App. 1993).
C.

The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Molen's Motion To Strike
Portions Of His PSI
Hearsay information in a PSI must be disregarded if there is no

reasonable basis to deem it reliable, as where the information is simply
conjecture. State v. Rodriauez, 132 ldaho 261, 263, 971 P.2d 327, 329 (Ct. App.
1998). It is sufficient, however, to provide the court with "information to make an
independent determination on the reliability of the hearsay statements."

at

264, 971 P.2d at 330. Here, the PSI provided information for the court to make

that determination and, therefore, did not contain information that needed to be
excluded from the PSI.
As part of the presentence investigation, the PSI investigator called Child
Protective Services in Utah County, Utah asking them for any information
involving Molen during the time period that Molen resided in that county. Utah
County reported having information on a Scott Molen, born July 30, 1960.~(PSI,
p.8.) That information was a claim of sexual abuse of a minor child. (PSI, p.8.)
The PSI report made clear, however, that the investigator could not confirm the
claim of child abuse involved Molen because there was no matching record,
photo, or fingerprints associated with the information

-- just

his name and a

partially correct birthdate. (PSI, p.8.) Because the PSI provided the court with
information upon which it could base an independent determination of the
reliability of that information, inclusion was proper and there was no basis to
have it stricken..

Rodriauez, 132 ldaho at 263-64, 971 P.2d at 329-30.

Here, the judge recognized the deficiency and agreed not to consider it for
purposes of sentencing. However, the judge did not strike it from the record:
"Yes. I am not actually going to X it out in the report, but I am certainly not going
to consider it." (Sent. Tr., p.6, Ls.21-23.) Molen claims this was error, relying on
State v. Person, 145 ldaho 293, 297, 178 P.3d 658, 662 (Ct. App. 2007), in
which the court of appeals "recommended[ed]" that a district court "cross out"
portions of the PSI that are "disregarded by the court at sentencing." The court

Molen's date of birth is unclear. The PSI provides two dates: July 7, 1960 and
July 6, 1960. The PSI also notes Molen's numerous aliases.

of appeals' recommendation in Person does not require a district court to
physically cross out certain information simply because a defendant requests
that it do so.

Id. This is particularly true where, as here, the information provided

in the PSI is not inaccurate and specifically notes the inability to confirm the
information obtained. The fact that the district court ultimately concluded it would
not consider it did not require the court to cross the information out.
Consequently, there is certainly no need to remand this case for that purpose.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and
sentence entered upon the jury verdict finding Molen guilty of lewd conduct with
a minor child under the age of sixteen.
DATED this 12th day of February, 2009.

j ~ e ~Attorney
u t ~ keneral
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 12th day of February, 2009, sewed a
true and correct copy of the'attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a file
stamped copy addressed to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.

heputy Attorney benera~

